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TRACING AN ANTITRUST INJURY IN SECONDARY
LINE PRICE DISCRIMINATION CASES
INTRODUCTION

The Robinson-Patman amendment' to section 2(a) of the Clayton
Act 2 protects small businesses from the economic bargaining power of
their larger competitors by prohibiting sellers from discriminating in
price between competing purchasers of similar goods. Under section 4
of the Clayton Act, 3 a private plaintiff may sue for treble damages if
he can prove that he was injured by an illegal price discrimination. In
J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,4 the Supreme Court
ruled that presumptive injury and "automatic damages" cannot be
inferred from the existence and extent of a price difference. 5 In order
to recover treble damages, the plaintiff must now prove that he
suffered an actual, "antitrust" injury6 resulting from the anticompetitive effects of the Robinson-Patman violation. 7 By requiring proof of
actual injury in a section 2(a) case, the Court resolved an issue that
had split the lower federal courts.8 The Court, however, did not
delineate the standard of proof necessary for a plaintiff to show that
his injury was attributable to a Robinson-Patman violation.9
This Note examines the plaintiff's burden of proving both a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act and an actual, antitrust injury

1. Ch.592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976)).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
3. Id. § 15.
4. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).

5. Id. at 561-63.
6. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)
(antitrust injury is "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and
that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful").
7. 451 U.S. at 562.
8. The majority of circuit courts had held that -automatic damages' could not
be inferred. See John B. Hull, Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc., 588 F.2d
24, 28 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Harrelson v. Texaco, Inc.,
486 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'g inern. sub nor. McCaskill v.Texaco, Inc., 351
F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (S.D. Ala. 1972); Continental Oil Co. v.Frontier Ref. Co., 338
F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Dantzler v. Dictograph Prods., Inc.,
309 F.2d 326, 328-29 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 970 (1963); Kidd v. Esso
Stand. Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497, 498-99 (6th Cir. 1961) (per curiam): Enterprise
Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965
(1957). Two circuits supported the -automatic damages" theory. See Fowler Mfg.
Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012
(1970); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945).
9. 451 U.S. at 568-69. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court
to determine whether Chrysler had in fact violated the Robinson-Patman Act, only
then could the issue of damages be resolved. Id.
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caused by the violation. An antitrust injury and a Robinson-Patman
violation are different elements of the plaintiff's burden of proof.
Although they overlap in theory, they contemplate different competi-

tive injuries and require independent evaluation.' 0
Part I of this Note discusses the plaintiff's requirement of establishing a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) currently seeks to establish a violation more precisely
and with greater reference to probative facts than it has in the past."I
The Court in J. Truett Payne implied that a private plaintiff will have
to establish the Robinson-Patman violation with at least as much
certainty as is required by the FTC.12
Part II discusses the plaintiff's burden of establishing an antitrust
injury in order to recover treble damages under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. Price discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Pat-

man Act that results in a "potential" lessening of competition will not

always create a remedial private injury under section 4.13 The rival's
increased profits alone will not cause specific injury to the plaintiff if
the rival merely "pockets" the price difference.14 An antitrust injury
10. "Antitrust injury" is a theoretical concept that requires different degrees of
specificity depending on the purpose for which it is being invoked. When it is initially
used to determine if the plaintiff has standing to trace his injury, he need only show
that he was in the "target area" of the Robinson-Patman violation. Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Terin-1977.
77 Colum. L. Rev. 979, 997 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Handler I]; McEntee &
Kahrl, Damages Caused by the Acquisition and Use of Monopoly Power, 49 Antitrust
L.J. 165, 182 (1980); Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 467, 497 (1980); Timberlake, The
Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under
the Antitrust Laws, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 231, 240-41 (1961); Tomlin, Private
Recovery Under the Robinson-PatmanAct-An Analisis and a Suggestion, 43 Tex.
L. Rev. 168, 175 (1964).
11. See FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 527-28 (1963); Foremost Dairies, Inc.
v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674. 678-79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965).
12. 451 U.S. at 561-62. In FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), the
Court had allowed the Commission to infer resulting injuries from a substantial price
discrimination. Id. at 46-47, 50. The J. Truett Payne Court distinguished Morton
Salt on the grounds that the plaintiff was claiming a Robinson-Patman Act violation
in conjunction with a Clayton Act § 4 treble damages suit that, unlike injunctive
actions, requires proof of actual injury and anticompetitive effects. 451 U.S. at 56163.
13. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1981);
Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 670 & n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 436 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (2d Cir), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 911 (1971).
14. Handler, The Shift from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 32-33
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Handler II]; see Dantzler v. Dictograph Prods., Inc., 309
F.2d 326, 329-30 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 970 (1963); McCaskill v.
Texaco, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Harrelson v. Texaco, Inc., 486 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1973).
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will only occur if the rival actually uses his larger profit margin to
solicit customers and the plaintiff consequently loses either customers

or profits.' 5

It has been alleged that customer solicitation can only be estab-

lished by showing that the defendant lowered his resale price.' 6 In J.

Truett Payne, however, the Court specifically refused to rule as a
matter of law whether the plaintiff must prove that the favored
competitor used his price advantage to lower his resale price to his
customers.17 The Court thus left open the possibility that other factors may be considered in establishing a Robinson-Patman Act violation if the plaintiff can trace his injury to a different but equally
specific and present form of customer solicitation, such as increased
advertising or additional services. This Note concludes that if potential non-price acts may be sufficiently anticompetitive to establish a
section 2(a) violation, they should be considered equally sufficient
grounds for private damages if a present injury can be traced to them.
Given the more stringent initial burden of proving the Robinson-

Patman Act violation, the plaintiff should be allowed some degree of
latitude in tracing his lost sales or profits to his favored competitor.
I.

PROOF OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT VIOLATION

The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discriminations between
competing purchasers of similar goods which have the capacity to
injure competition.' 8 To establish a section 2(a) violation the private
15. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir.
1979), vacated and remanded sub nom. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981); Kidd v. Esso Stand. Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497, 498 (6th Cir.
1961) (per curiam); Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 41 (W.D. La. 1957);
Handler I, supra note 10, at 993; Heim, Measuring Damages in Robinson-Patinan
Act Secondary Line Price Discrimination Cases, 49 Antitrust L.J. 201, 204 (1980).
16. Handler I, supra note 10, at 992-93; see Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 1980-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,343, at 75,756-57 (E.D. Wash. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981): Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146,
147 (D. Or. 1958).
17. 451 U.S. at 564 n.4.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The private plaintiff must show the existence of a
price difference and the resultant anticompetitive effect. Piraino, The Legality of
Distributor Incentive Discount Plans Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 58 Wash.
U.L.Q. 807, 809 (1980); Note, Private Recovery Under the Robinson-PatmanAct:
Confusion in the Courts on the Proper Measure of Damages, 21 Syracuse L. Rev.
941, 942 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Confusion in the Courts]; see Hanson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 482 F.2d 220, 227 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1136 (1974); Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 698, 702-04 (9th
Cir. 1964); Alexander v. Texas Co., 165 F. Supp. 53, 56-57 (W.D. La. 1958).
Although in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960), the Supreme Court
held that a price difference is the equivalent of a price discrimination, id. at 549, it is
clear that the statute itself establishes that the price differential must also be shown to
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plaintiff must demonstrate both a potentid injury to competition",
20

and the capacity of the price discrimination to cause this injury.
A. The Plaintiff's Burden of Defining the Injury

The plaintiff's task of defining a section 2(a) injury is made difficult
by the Robinson-Patman Act's prohibition of both broad and narrow

injuries to competition.2 1 In a broad sense, the statute prohibits price
discriminations that tend to lessen competition in the overall market. 22 In the narrow sense, the statute seeks to protect the business
have potential anticompetitive effects. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976); see Heim, supra
note 15, at 201 n.2.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The statute prohibits discriminations which
"may . . .substantially . . . lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them .... .. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Heim, supra note 15, at 201 n.2. The "capacity" element stems from the
statute's "prophylactic" prohibition of price discriminations which "may" have anticompetitive effects. Congress sought to avoid the crippling results of full scale anticompetitive behavior by catching price discrimination in its incipiency and preventing its growth. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948); Corn Prods.
Refin. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett
Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded sub
nom. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981); S.Rep. No.
1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936); H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. 8
(1936); A Symposium on the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Nw. U. L. Rev. 196, 203
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Symposium]. To establish the capacity of the price
discrimination to injure competition, plaintiff must prove either that the discrimination is "substantial" in degree or that its effect on competition is "probable." See infra
notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
21. C. Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 518-19 (1959); see Foremost
Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965):
Austern, Presumption and PercipienceAbout Competitive Effect Under Section 2 of
the Clayton Act, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 773, 776 n.17 (1968); Symposium, supra note 20,
at 197. Some commentators and courts distinguish three forms of competitive harm.
They divide the "broad" injury into injury to competition in the overall market and
injury that results from the possible creation of monopoly power. The "narrow"
injury between immediate competitors is then the third proscribed effect. See Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 40 (W.D. La. 1957): Blakeney, Price Discrimination Laws: An Economic Perspective, 19 Duq. L. Rev. 479, 487-88 (1981); Tomlin,
supra note 10, at 174-75.
22. In language borrowed from § 2 of the original Clayton Act, the RobinsonPatman amendment prohibits price discriminations "where the effect ...may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). "Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act
seeks to protect against two types of injuries which may result from the discriminatory pricing policies of an interstate seller. The probability of a general injury to
competitive conditions in the market in which the seller or the purchaser sells his
product will support a cease and desist order or afford an aggrieved party the basis
for an action in damages. An injury of this broad nature is more prevalent in
primary-line cases, as where a dominant seller uses discriminatory pricing policies to
enhance its market position and therefore diminish the general vigor of competition
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opportunities of those involved in marketing a particular product.2

Because of these dual objectives, the statute has been criticized as

inherently contradictory.2 4 If the small business is an inefficient market participant that represents a deadweight social cost and a misallocation of resources, its protection to avoid a narrow injury would

cause a broad injury to the overall market. -

The confusion surrounding this conflict stems from the use of the
Robinson-Patman Act's narrow injury provision to protect individual
competitors.2 6 Although this is too limited an application of the
statute under modern economic theory,2 7 it is an understandable interpretation in light of the statute's legislative history 2S By enacting

the Robinson-Patman amendment in 1937, Congress sought to
strengthen the Clayton Act, which only focused on broad injuries.
Congress perceived this approach to be too restrictive.2 9 The Robinor to increase the concentration of market power in the industry." Foremost Dairies,

Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965).
23. The Robinson-Patman amendment added a provision prohibiting price discriminations "where the effect . . . may be ... to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
"[T]he act also protects the victim of unwarranted price differentials from a more
narrow type of injury ..
." Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC. 348 F.2d 674. 678 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965).
24. Levi, The Robinson-PatmanAct-Is it in the Public Interest?, 1 ABA Sec.
Antitrust L. Proc. 60, 64 (1952). "The conflict within the [Robinson-Patman] Act is
reflected in its use of the word 'competition' . . . . The result is that competition
itself under the Act becomes under some circumstances anticompetitive. Behavior
which is natural to firms when they are acting as competitively as they can, now
becomes, under some conditions, a violation of law." Id. at 64: accord Austern, supra
note 21, at 776; Symposium, supra note 20, at 207-08. The inherent contradiction has
surfaced in court opinions as well. See, e.g.. E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d
152, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958): Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 788-89 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed.

344 U.S. 206 (1952).
25. See Blakeney, supra note 21, at 503.
26. C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 12, F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the
Robinson-Patman Act 113-14 (1962 & Supp. 1964): Tomlin, supra note 10, at 175;
Confusion in the Courts, supra note 18, at 941. But see International Air Indus., Inc.
v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 721 (5th Cir. 1975) ("neither the Act nor
any social value compels the sheltering of an individual competitor, at the expense of
the public interest, from the competitive process"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
27. See infra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
28. See To Amend the Clayton Act: HearingBefore the Comm. on the Judiciary,

House of Rep., on H.R. 8442, 4995 & 5062. 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1935)
(statement of Rep. Patman) [hereinafter cited as 1935 Hearing].
29. See H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936); 80 Cong. Rec. 9417
(1936); Symposium, supra note 20, at 197-98. Section 2 of the Clayton Act was
thought to be too narrow in practice "in requiring a showing of general injury to
competitive conditions in the line of commerce concerned; whereas the more immediately important concern is in injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimination. Only through such injuries, in fact, can the larger general injury result, and to
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son-Patman amendment was thus intended to prevent injuries at the
secondary level between the seller's competing purchasers, 30 whereas
the original Clayton Act monitored competition in the overall primary-line market. 3'
The legislative objective behind this change was to protect the
"little man" from the bargaining strength of his larger rivals 32 and to
provide that all buyers in direct competition would receive evenhanded treatment from their suppliers. 3 3 By providing such protection, Congress sacrificed vigorous short-run competition and temporary efficiency in order to maintain a more stable form of long-run
competition by keeping the market fully operative. 34 It was believed

catch the weed in the seed will keep it from coming to flower." S. Rep. No. 1502.
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936) (report of Sen. Logan).
30. E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1956), cert, denied,
355 U.S. 941 (1958); see FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945).
31. Rez, Causation and Automatic Damages in Secondary-Line Injury Cases
Under Section 2a of the Robinson-PatmanAct: Is Fowler v. Gorlick Dead?, 55 Notre
Dame Law. 660, 660 n.2 (1980); see 1935 Hearings,supra note 28, at 5-6 (statement
of Rep. Patman).
32. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1960); FTC v. Henry
Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168-69 (1960); Piraino, supra note 18, at 808; Tomlin,
supra note 10, at 170. In enacting the Robinson-Patman amendment, Congress wits
clearly concerned with the survival of the spirit behind the "mom and pop" store.
Representative Patman warned that "the day of the independent merchant is gone
unless something is done and done quickly .... [W]e have reached the crossroads;
we must either turn the food and grocery business of this country . . .over to a few
corporate chains, or we have got to pass laws that will give the people, who built this
country in time of peace and who saved it in time of war, an opportunity to
exist .... 1935 Hearings,supra note 28, at 5-6 (statement of Rep. Patman); accord
80 Cong. Rec. 8134-35 (1936) (statement of Rep. Nichols); C. Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act 6-11 (rev. 2d ed.
1959); 1 ABA See. Antitrust Law, Monograph 4, The Robinson-Patman Act: Policy
and Law 97 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Policy and Law]. Otherwise, "''such differentials would become instruments of favor and privilege and weapons of competitive
oppression.' "FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1948) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1936)); accord Blakeney, supra note 21, at 479 n.2;
Symposium, supra note 20, at 197; Confusion in the Courts, supra note 18, at 942.
33. Piraino, supra note 18, at 808; see FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520
(1963); FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960); FTC v. Morton Salt
Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43, 49 (1948); FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543
F.2d 1019, 1026 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); American Motors
Corp. v. FTC, 384 F.2d 247, 251 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1012 (1968);
Purolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 883 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1045 (1968); C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 29-30; Rowe, Price Differentials
and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-PatmanAct, 66 Yale
L.J. 1, 34 (1956); Policy and Law, supra note 32, at 22; Symposium, supra note 20,
at 207; Confusion in the Courts, supra note 18, at 942.
34. E. Kinter, A Robinson-Patman Primer 343-44 (2d ed. 1979); see Cooper,
Price Discrimination Law and Economic Efficiency, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 962, 963
(1977).
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that the elimination or weakening of individual competitors would

eventually result in monopoly power, 35 and that any compelling shortrun economic motivations would satisfy one of the statute's express
defenses. 36 Less imperative efficiency justifications were outweighed
by the societal benefits38 from equal opportunit 37 and the broader
distribution of income.
Modern economists argue, however, that the protection of individual competitors does not necessarily enhance competition and may
actually serve to penalize marketing efficiency. 39 In pure economic

35. Symposium, supra note 20, at 197-98, 203. "The Robinson-Patman Act rests
on the conviction that efficiency creates monopoly power for large purchasers, that
this power, when combined with the inevitable monopoly possessed by large sellers,
results in.. . further elimination of small dealers and the greater increase of monopoly." Levi, supra note 24, at 62: see C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 518; Policy and
Law, supra note 32, at 22-23; Confusion in the Courts, supra note 18, at 942.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The Act recognizes three economic defenses: The
challenged price differential may be made in good faith to meet a competitor's
equally low price ("meeting competition" defense). A seller may make due allowance
for differences in manufacture or delivery costs ("cost justification" defense). A price
differentiation may also be in response to changing conditions affecting the product's
marketability ("changing conditions" defense). Id.; see E. Kinter, supra note 34, at
343-44; Policy and Law, supra note 32, at 26. But see Symiposiun. supra note 20, at
205. "[T]hese defenses under the terms of the Act as interpreted by the courts are
subject to very stringent interpretation if the FTC desires." Id. "Under the Act,
discriminations resulting from the lower costs of selling to larger buyers are supposedly protected by the cost justification defense. However, aside from the fact that
prices are determined by competition rather than cost studies, the difficult" and
expense of making the required cost analysis and the impossibility of predicting what
savings will be found will discourage price concessions based on alleged savings." Id.
at 208 n.45; accord Levi, supra note 24, at 68 ("Normal conduct does not suffice for
these defenses.").
37. C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 521. Implicit in the social value of equal
opportunity are the concepts of fairness and rugged individualism. The goals of
fairness and economic efficiency often conflict, and require a compromise. The
Robinson-Patman Act has been criticized for "invok[ing] standards of fairness that
are not implicit in the effort to maintain a competitive economy." Id. Some critics
claim that society must balance its objectives of economic efficiency, social equity
and political freedom. Blakeney, supra note 21, at 494; Cooper, supra note 34, at
962. Others claim that fair treatment of competitors outweighs any minor loss in
efficiency that results from a more perfect allocation of resources. Policy and Law,
supra note 32, at 26-27. There is a strong belief that individual effort merits protection in our economic system. Tomlin, supra note 10, at 170; see S. Rep. No. 1502,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936); H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936); 80
Cong. Rec. 9417 (1936); Symposium, supra note 20, at 197-98. "[T]he freedom
guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic
muscle it can muster." United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
38. See Blakeney, supra note 21, at 495-96; Cooper, supra note 34, at 965-66.
39. C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 543 ("The effect is likely to be some reduction
of competitive incentive and of the intensity of competition on the seller's side of the
market."); F. Rowe, supra note 26, at 34 ("Robinson-Patman law.. . enacts a legal
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theory, a price discrimination means only that the same product is
sold to different customers at prices unrelated to differences in transaction costs. 40 Modern economists are reluctant, however, to apply
this definition categorically. First, the complexity of the present-day

market structure makes it difficult to segregate and measure relevant

cost factors. 41 Second, price discriminations have different purposes

today than they did historically. 42 Some types of price discrimination
may be both efficient and pro-competitive in the general, interbrand

market even though they do not meet one of the efficiency defenses
provided for in the statute. 43 For example, a manufacturer may
respond to interbrand competitive pressures by furthering competition

between his retail dealers. 44 By prohibiting price discriminations in
penalty on economic integration .... ); Cooper, supra note 34, at 969 (seller
cannot determine "whether price differences involve discrimination or a desirable
response to competition and considerations of efficiency"); Levi, supra note 24, at 64
("Behavior which is natural to firms when they are acting as competitively as they
can, now becomes, under some conditions, a violation of law."); Symposium, supra
note 20, at 208 n.45 (sellers need to experiment). But see E. Kintner, supra note 34.
at 343-45 (Robinson-Patman Act has a sound economic foundation; anticompetitive
effects result from inept application of the statute). Courts have only recently begun
to look more closely at specific competitive effects in both the interbrand and
intrabrand markets in order to weigh pro-competitive results with potential competitive injuries. See, e.g., Rod Baxter Imports, Inc. v. Saab-Scania of Am., Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 245, 248-49 (D. Minn. 1980); Tosa Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 1974 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,006, at 96,449-50 (E.D. Wis. 1974). But
see American Motors Corp. v. FTC, 384 F.2d 247, 250 (6th Cir. 1967) ("meager"
evidence of a potential injury sufficient to shift burden of proof to seller), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1012 (1968).
40. See Blakeney, supra note 21, at 486; Cooper, supra note 34, at 963.
41. F. Rowe, supra note 26, at 31; Blakeney, supra note 21, at 485-86, Cooper,
supra note 34, at 981-82; Tomlin, supra note 10, at 189; Symposium, supra note 20,
at 200.
42. See Blakeney, mupra note 21, at 485-86; Cooper, supra note 34, at 963-64.
43. See supra note 36. The defense of meeting competition in good faith is not
applicable because the program is usually a general one not specifically tailored to an
individual situation. C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 240; see, e.g., FTC v. A.E.
Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 758 (1945); Surprise Brassiere Co. v. FTC, 406 F.2d
711, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1969); Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959); C.E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d
37, 41 (7th Cir. 1957), modified on other grounds per curiam sub nom. Moog Indus.,
Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 155-56
(7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); accord Austern, supra note 21, at
811-12; Levi, supra note 24, at 65; Policy and Law, supra note 32, at 97. The
Supreme Court, however, has agreed to determine whether the defense is available
only on a customer-by-customer basis or whether it may be justified as a response to
broader market conditions. Vance Beverages, Inc. v. Falls City Indus., Inc., 654
F.2d 1224, 1230 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. Mar. 1,
1982) (No. 81-1271). The defense of cost justification is realistically unavailable
because it is difficult to assemble the specific cost information necessary to establish
the defense. C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 238.
44. He may do this by offering his dealers various rebates as part of a dealerincentive program. "Although such plans appear to enhance competition by giving
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the intrabrand market, the Robinson-Patman Act inhibits the manufacturer's natural responses to the competitive pressures in the larger,
40 restricts innovainterbrand market. 45 This results in price rigidity,
47 and invites collusion. 48
tive marketing schemes
Modern economists further argue that competition in general suffers when individual competitors are artificially protected, because
the incidental elimination of a small business may be the result of
overall increased efficiency. 49 Affording individual competitors a
false sense of security reduces competitive vigor and perpetuates inefficient market behavior. 50 The ultimate consumer will consequently

be penalized by artificial prices, product deficiencies, and a less than
optimal distribution of resources. This result subverts a primary objec-

tive of the antitrust laws-the promotion of competition for the benefit of the economy and the consumer. 5'

The conflict between the broad and narrow competitive effects can
be resolved if the narrow injury is defined as an injury to a class or
group of competitors rather than as an injury to individuals.5 2 Such
each distributor an incentive to aggressively promote the seller's products, the plans
are also likely to result in competing distributors receiving different prices for identical goods." Piraino, supra note 18, at 807; accord Blakeney, supra note 21, at 498501; Cooper, supra note 34, at 964-66. It has been argued that such programs are
defensible because they lack "the 'causal nexus' between the price discrimination and
any injury to competition." Piraino, supra note 18, at 814. The other conceptual
basis for allowing such programs is that they are not a price discrimination at all if
they offer equal opportunities, although not necessarily equal prices, to all the
dealers concerned. This is referred to as the " non-discrimination' " theory. Id. at
813.
45. See F. Rowe, supra note 26, at 31 & n.33; Cooper, supra note 34, at 975;
Symposium, supra note 20, at 208 n.45.
46. See F. Rowe, supra note 26, at 113-14; Handler II, supra note 14, at 35;
Levi, supra note 24, at 61-62; Policy and Law, supra note 32, at 27; Symposium,
supra note 20, at 205-06. In Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953), the
Supreme Court warned against interpreting the Robinson-Patman Act so as to "give
rise to a price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of other
antitrust legislation." Id. at 63.
47. See C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 543; F. Rowe, supra note 26, at 31.
48. See Levi, supra note 24, at 62, 74; Policy and Law, supra note 32, at 27. To
legally discriminate in order to meet competition, a seller must be able to show
specific prices and practices of the threatening rival. Such intimate knowledge of
another seller's operations encourages collusion and information exchanges which
may be prohibited under the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
49. C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 543; Blakeney., supra note 21, at 494-95 &
n.58; Cooper, supra note 34, at 982- Symposium, supra note 20, at 208 & n.45.
50. See Blakeney, supra note 21, at 495 n.58; Cooper, supra note 34, at 982;
Symposium, supra note 20, at 208.
51. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63 (1953); Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-51 (1951); F. Rowe, supra note 26, at 113-14;
Blakeney, supra note 21, at 494-95; Levi, supra note 24, at 61-62; Symposium, supra
note 20, at 206-07 & n.43; Confusion in the Courts, supra note 18, at 941.
52. See C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 520-21.
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an approach would be more in keeping with the Robinson-Patman

Act's objective "to preserve the business opportunities of buyers and
sellers from damage by price discriminations, not to preserve single

competitors from damage from all sources."

53

Instead of showing the

potential failure of one marginal dealer, therefore, the Act requires
that the price discrimination be such that any marginal dealer similarly situated would suffer the same injury. 5
This approach would curtail the protection of dealers whose failure
results from personal inefficiencies rather than from the suspect price

discrimination and would, moreover, look to the effect of the discrim-

ination on the overall market structure. 5 5 The power to eliminate an
entire class of competitors, even if arguably desirable, offends social
values of competitive "fairness." 5 The elimination of one dealer in
an otherwise healthy market, however, does not have the same
present or potential negative effect on the market that the loss of a
class would have. Thus, the narrow injury provision cannot justifiably
be invoked for the isolated preservation of an individual competitor
57
unless his injury meets the more comprehensive definition.
53. Id. at 521. This view of the narrow injury to competition has been clouded
by FTC decisions inferring injury to a group of competitors from the fact of a price
difference. As a result, their decisions can be read as finding a Robinson-Patman
violation from prospective damage to an individual competitor without clear examination of the economic ramifications of the price discrimination. See Symposium.
supra note 20, at 199; see, e.g., Morton Salt Co., 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944), rev'd, 162
F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 37 (1948); A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 34 F.T.C.
1362 (1942), rev'd, 144 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1944), rev'd, 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
54. For example, the elimination of one small grocery store would be a narrow
injury to competition if its failure was caused not by individual inadequacies, but by
a price discrimination that would have caused the same economic losses to other
small grocery stores similarly situated. Even though the price discrimination might
actually cause the elimination of only one small store, the seller's potential to cause
the elimination of an entire class of competitors, thus restructuring the entire market,
could justifiably be inferred. See C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 537. Such a manipulative effect on the market demonstrates a sufficient potential for future competitive
abuse to violate the Act, because any initial increase in market competition is being
purchased at too great a social cost. See id. at 538; Levi, supra note 24, at 63:
Symposium, supra note 20, at 203.
55. C. Edwards, s-upra note 21, at 520; see Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. KerrMcGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 798-99 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977):
International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 721-22 &
n.12 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); FTC v. Standard Motor
Prods., Inc., 371 F.2d 613, 619-20 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1967); American Oil Co. v. FTC,
325 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964); AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1961); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v.
Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 954, 956 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 843 (1960).
56. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
57. C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 537. "Injury to competition in the narrow
sense would have been perceived only where there were market changes similar to,
though perhaps smaller than, those that might demonstrate injury in the broad
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B. Plaintiff's Burden of Demonstratingthe Anticompetitive
Effect of the Discrimination
To meet his initial burden of proof in a section 2(a) case, the private

plaintiff must define the relevant competitive threat prohibited by the
Robinson-Patman Act. He must be able to establish either a potential

injury to competition generally or a diminution of the business opportunities of a defined class of competitors. He cannot meet this burden

merely by demonstrating his own injury. Having placed the price
discrimination within the scope of the Robinson-Patman Act, the

plaintiff must prove that it has the capacity to cause the proscribed
anticompetitive effects.

It is continually reiterated that section 2(a) is a "prophylactic"

statute 58 that is violated merely upon a showing that "the effect of

such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition." 59

The statute itself is unclear as to the standard of proof required to
establish a potential injury. 0 Although the word "substantially" does
appear in reference to the "broad" competitive injury, 1 it is omitted
2
in the description of the "narrow" injury.1
Initially, in FTC injunctive actions, the courts deferred to the
Commission's judgment 63 and held that there was a violation where
an injury could "possibly" occur. 64 The Commission ignored any
evidence of actual effects and inferred that differences in prices without any obvious economic justification resulted in differences in competitive opportunities. 65 It determined that if it could show a subsense-expansion of the market share of the favored buyer and impairment of the
position of his competitors as a group." Id.
58. See, e.g., J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 561
(1981); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
60. See C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 519 n.1; Levi, supra note 24, at 61.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
62. See C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 519 n.I.
63. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 54 (1948); Purolator Prods., Inc. v.
FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); Page,
supra note 10, at 503; Symposium, supra note 20, at 201. This deference is further
mandated by statute: "The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by
evidence, shall be conclusive." 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§ 45(c) (1976)).
64. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1948); Heim, supra note 15,
at 202.
65. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1948); see Kroger Co. v. FTC,
438 F.2d 1372, 1379 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); American Motors
Corp. v. FTC, 384 F.2d 247, 250 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1012 (1968);
Policy and Law, supra note 32, at 98; Symposium, supra note 20, at 199. The
"inference of injury rule" was established by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). Morton Salt sold its Blue Label brand of salt on a
standard quantity discount system available to all purchasers. Id. at 40-41. Under
this system the purchaser paid for the salt and delivery according to the quantity
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stantial price difference in a business where profit margins were low
and competition was keen, it could infer that the competitive opportunities of certain purchasers were injured.6 6 Thus, the Commission
found violations despite testimony by the "injured" competitors that
their profits were actually increasing and detailed7 cost analysis reports
demonstratively justified the price differentials.
Recent circuit cases have indicated that the requirement for demonstrated competitive effects is increasing; the standard has been intensified from proof of a "reasonable possibility" of competitive injury to a
"reasonable probability" or "substantial effect" test.08 Part of the
shift can be attributed to the concern of the Commission and the
purchased. Larger stores would buy in larger quantities, thereby effectively paying
less for the salt. Id. In condemning the Morton Salt system, the Court explained that
"the language of the Act, and the legislative history ...show that Congress meant
by using the words 'discrimination in price' in § 2 that in a case involving competitive
injury between a seller's customers the Commission need only prove that a seller had
charged one purchaser a higher price for like goods than he had charged one or more
of the purchaser's competitors. . . . [T]he statute does not require the Commission
to find that injury has actually resulted. . . . Here the Commission found what
would appear to be obvious, that the competitive opportunities of certain merchants
were injured when they had to pay respondent substantially more for their goods
than their competitors had to pay. The findings are adequate." Id. at 45-47 (footnotes omitted).
66. C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 234; Austern, supra note 21, at 775-77, see,
e.g., Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 959 (1965); C.E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37, 40 (7th Cir. 1957),
modified on other grounds per curiam sub nom. Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S.
411 (1958); Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 154-55 (7th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d
43, 51 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
67. C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 234. The inference "has risen superior to
evidence that the disfavored customers have grown and prospered, to evidence that
the beneficiaries of the discrimination were small and weak, and to unanimous
statements by the disfavored customers that they were not injured." Id. at 533
(footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Purolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 880 (7th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348
F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); Standard Motor Prods.,
Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959): E.
Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
941 (1958); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 49-51 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd per
curiam, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
68. See, e.g., FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 527 (1963) ("[FTC] must make
realistic appraisals of relevant competitive facts . ..[and an] adequate probative
analysis"); Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466 F.2d 1163, 1174 (7th
Cir. 1972) ("reasonable probability of substantial injury to competition"); Foremost
Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir.) ("probability of a general injury to
competitive conditions" or "where the result may be substantially to 'injure, destroy,
or prevent competition' "), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965). In both Bargain Car
Wash, 466 F.2d at 1163, and Foremost Dairies, 348 F.2d at 678-79, however, the
courts essentially inferred an injury without analyzing the price discrimination's
economic effects. See Austern, supra note 21, at 776 & n.19.
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courts with the potential conflict between the Robinson-Patman Act
and modern economic theory.69 Both the FTC and the courts are
beginning to recognize the need to prove a narrow competitive injury
more precisely and with reference to probative facts.70
The private plaintiff in section 2(a) cases must meet the standard of
proof required of the FTC"' and may in fact be held to a higher
standard in that he is not accorded the deference traditionally shown
to the Commission. The courts defer to the FTC as experts in antitrust
matters. 72 Moreover, there is concern that the FTC's effective and
efficient administration of these laws would be hampered by unnecessary and uninvited judicial interference. 73 These considerations are
not present with reference to a private plaintiff. Therefore, although
the FTC can arguably still establish a violation based on a "possible"
injury, 74 the private plaintiff must establish that the price discrimination presents at least a "reasonable probability" of competitive injury
to his class or group of competitors. 5
69. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961). "The Act is
really referring to the effect upon competition and not merely upon competitors.... In this respect § 2(a) must be read in conformity with the public policy of
preserving competition, but it is not concerned with mere shifts of business between
competitors. It is concerned with substantial impairment of the vigor or health of the
contest for business, regardless of which competitor wins or loses." Id. at 840 (footnotes omitted); accord Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 418 F.2d 793,
806 (9th Cir. 1969); Refrigeration Eng'g Corp. v. Frick Co., 370 F. Supp. 702, 713
(W.D. Tex. 1974); C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 537; Symposium, supra note 20, at
199.
70. See FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 527 (1963): Foremost Dairies, Inc. v.
FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 289 F.2d 835, 843 (7th Cir. 1961): Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc.,
1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,343, at 75,753 (E.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981): Austern, supra note 21. at 779; Page, supra
note 10, at 467-68.
71. See Williams Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Contin. Baking Co., No. 794207, slip op. at 3932 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 1982) (en banc) (amended opinion) (Inglis
must prove that Continental's price discrimination produced a requisite effect on
competition"); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 &
n.6 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[I]n 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), Congress proscribed only those price
differences which have a substantial effect on competition. In effect, Congress has
determined that price differentiation poses a threat to competition sufficient to
justify legal intervention only where such an effect can be shown."), cert. dcnicd, 439
U.S. 829 (1978); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 418 F.2d 793, 806 (9th
Cir. 1969) ("The cases uniformly hold that § 2 of the Act . . . only prohibits price
discrimination by a seller where the 'effect' causes or may cause forbidden competitive injury.").
72. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 54 (1948): Page, supra note 10, at
503-04.
73. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 54 (1948): Page, supra note 10, at
503; supra note 63 and accompanying text.
74. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1948).
75. Austern, supra note 21, at 777-79, 796 (discusses stricter standard for primary
line private plaintiff cases); see C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 531 & n.12 (stricter
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PROOF OF ACTUAL ANTITRUST INJURY

The current trend in the law is to require private plaintiffs in
section 2(a) cases to meet a higher standard in proving a violation of

the Robinson-Patman Act. The requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate more probative effects forces him to establish a greater market
impact and prevents him from relying solely on proof of his personal
injury. In order to recover treble damages under section 4 of the

Clayton Act, however, a personal antitrust injury must also be estab-

lished. 7

To prove an antitrust injury in a Robinson-Patman second-

ary-line case, the private plaintiff must show a "present" injury that is
"traceable. 77 'r The plaintiff's loss must parallel and result from a
benefit to the favored competitor. 8

A. The Concept of an Antitrust Injury
The Supreme Court first defined "antitrust injury" under section 4
in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,'7 a case involving a

section 7 Clayton Act violation.80 Section 7, like section 2(a), is a
prophylactic statute. It prohibits mergers where the effect "may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."

81

In Brunswick, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's

acquisition of a failing company violated section 7 because the rival
company did not become bankrupt as expected, and the plaintiffs
consequently lost business.8 2 The Court found that although the
plaintiffs' losses may have occurred " 'by reason of' the unlawful

acquisitions, [they] did not occur 'by reason of' that which made the
standard for primary line applied to secondary line in 1955 Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws); see, e.g., Bargain Car Wash, Inc.
v. Standard Oil Co., 466 F.2d 1163, 1174 (7th Cir. 1972); Rod Baxter Imports, Inc.
v. Saab-Scania of Am., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 245, 248-49 (D. Minn. 1980).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). To have standing a plaintiff need only show that he
was in the "target area" of the Robinson-Patman Act's protection. See Handler I,
supra note 10, at 995-97; McEntee & Kahrl, supra note 10, at 182; Page, supra note
10, at 497; Timberlake, supra note 10, at 241; Tomlin, supra note 10, at 175; Note,
Compensable Injuries Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
412, 416 n.35 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Compensable Injuries].
77. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Under section 4 of the Clayton Act, persons injured
"by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" are entitled to treble damages. Id.; see F. Rowe, supra note 26, at 530. "Since commercial hardship may arise
from an infinite range of factors, a fundamental prerequisite of any treble damage
recovery is that the plaintiff's injury is the causal consequence of the defendant's
proven violation." Id. (footnote omitted).
78. Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 41 (W.D. La. 1957); Rez, supra
note 31, at 666-69.
79. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
81. Id.
82. 429 U.S. at 480-81.
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acquisitions unlawful." 8 3 The injury was required to be a direct
result of the violation or of "anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation."' 4 Therefore, a plaintiff must not only prove that his
injury was a foreseeable result of the defendant's anticompetitive
behavior,8 5 but also that it was actually foreseen by Congress at the
time it made the activity illegal.8 6
Antitrust injury is thus a more narrow concept than that of proxi-

mate cause.8 7 The plaintiff must prove more than that he suffered an
actual injury caused by the antitrust violation; there must be "an

intimate relationship between the circumstances which make the
wrongdoer's conduct unlawful and the resulting harm which is the

subject of suit."8' 8 In a Robinson-Patman case, this "intimate relationship" manifests itself in two stages; first, there must be a price

difference that causes an actual injury to the plaintiff, and second,
this actual injury must be evidenced by a shift in the immediate

83. Id. at 488. Therefore, if the plaintiffs in Brunswick had lost business because
the defendant used his "deep pocket" to bolster the acquired company in a market of
relative "pygmies," then the plaintiffs would have suffered an antitrust injury because the larger company could resort to predatory pricing supported by its financial
advantages. See id. at 482; Areeda, Comment: Antitrust Violations Without Damage
Recoveries, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1127, 1133 (1976); Goetz, The Basic Rules of Antitrust
Damages, 49 Antitrust L.J. 125, 133 (1980); Handler I, supra note 10, at 990-91;
McEntee & Kahrl, supra note 10, at 183-84; Page, supra note 10, at 470, 491;
Compensable Injuries, supra note 76, at 415 n.30. In Brunswick, however, the

plaintiffs claimed only a loss of windfall profits, an injury that was unrelated to the
defendant's size or predatory conduct. The plaintiffs would have been in the same
position if no merger had occurred. 429 U.S. at 481, 487-88; see Areeda, supra, at
1133; Handier I, supra note 10, at 991; McEntee & Kahrl, supra note 10, at 184;
Page, supra note 10, at 470; Compensable Injuries, supra note 76, at 416. The
Brunswick Court pointed out that loss of windfall profits may not even constitute an
actual, much less an antitrust, injury for purposes of § 4. 429 U.S. at 488.
84. 429 U.S. at 489; see Handgards, Inc. v.Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 997 (9th

Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Handler I, supra note 10, at 990-92;
Compensable Injuries, supra note 76, at 416.

85. 429 U.S. at 489; see Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d
1133, 1136 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded sub non. J. Truett Payne Co. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601
F.2d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Handler I, supra
note 10, at 989-90; McEntee & Kahrl, supra note 10, at 184; Page, supra note 10, at
468, 491.
86. 429 U.S. at 487-89; McEntee & Kahrl, supra note 10, at 184.
87. To establish that a defendant's actions "proximately caused" the plaintiff's
injury, there must be "some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the
defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." W. Prosser, Handbook
of the Law of Torts § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971). In the context of proving an "antitrust
injury," however, the plaintiff must show that he was injured by the proscribed
effects of the antitrust violation and not just by the fact of the violation itself. See
supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
88. Handler I, supra note 10, at 990; accord Rez, supra note 31, at 669.
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relationship between the favored and non-favored purchasers. 80 To

show actual injury, the plaintiff must show actual lost sales or profits
caused by the price discrimination.9 0

To show antitrust injury, the

plaintiff must show that he lost these sales or profits to the favored
competitor.91 "Evidence of a slight decrease in market share roughly

coincident with the alleged violation is not sufficient .
".0.2.
Problems arise in defining an antitrust injury because the concept of
antitrust injury overlaps both the plaintiff's burden of proving damage-the fact of injury-and his burden of proving damages-the
amount of injury. 93 To prove the fact of injury, the plaintiff must
show that he was actually injured and that his injury was of the type
that the substantive antitrust law was designed to prevent.9 4 To
prove the amount of the injury the plaintiff must prove the extent to

which he lost profits or customers to the favored competitor.9 5 The

89. McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd
mem. sub nom. Harrelson v. Texaco, Inc., 486 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1973); Alexander
v.Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 41 (W.D. La. 1957).
90. See Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 671-73 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (expert testimony as to "inherent" economic effects insufficient); Kidd v. Esso
Stand. Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497, 498-99 (6th Cir. 1961) (per curiam) (requiring proof of
lost profits or customers to favored competitors); American Can Co. v. Russellville
Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1951) (evidentiary basis for awarding the
plaintiff damages for the alleged impairment of its competitive position was too
speculative and conjectural); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949) ("[tjhe only proper proof of damages is the
loss to the plaintiff's business"); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 226,
229 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("must establish with reasonable probability the existence of a
causal connection between defendants' violation of the antitrust law and plaintiffs'
revenue-impairing injury"); Rez, supra note 31, at 673.
91. Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,343, at 75,762
(E.D. Wash. 1980), aJf'd in part, rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981). "[I1f
the price discrimination ... was the cause of the plaintiffs' injury, the plaintiffs
should be able to match up their losses with gains to the favored competitors." Id.
92. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir.
1979) (footnote omitted), vacated and remanded sub noma. J. Truett Payne Co. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
93. See Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 811 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Page, supra note 10, at 490; Rez, supra note 31, at 66869; Timberlake, supra note 10, at 252.
94. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
95. Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,343, at 75,762-63
(E.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981); see
Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 458-59 (2d Cir.) (the plaintiff
had to show that his gallonage was lost to the favored customers and not to other
competitors in order to prove causation), cert. denied. 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Krieger
v. Texaco, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 108, 113 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (same); Youngson v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D. Or. 1958) (same); Alexander v. Texas
Co., 165 F. Supp. 53, 58 (W.D. La. 1958) ("Assuming that defendant committed
unlawful price discrimination, plaintiff must still show that Texaco's price differences were the proximate cause of a diversion of business from him to the 12
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plaintiff's burden of "tracing" his injury applies to both proofs; he will
not have sustained a Robinson-Patman injury if the favored competitor has not used the price allowance to solicit customers from him,9
and he will not be able to measure the amount of his injury without
showing what sales or profits he lost as a result of the rival's competitive advantage. In light of the courts' trend toward requiring more
stringent proof for a Robinson-Patman violation, a reevaluation of the
necessary proofs of damage and damages is necessary.
1. Fact of Antitrust Injury in a Robinson-Patman Case
In prohibiting price discriminations, Congress sought to protect
competition in both the overall market and within classes of individual competitors.97 In secondary-line price discrimination situations,
unfair competition between competing purchasers occurs if they pay
different prices for the same goods. The favored purchaser has a
competitive advantage over his rivals who pay more for the goods
because he can more easily lower his resale price, incur more business
expenses, or make a greater profit to facilitate expansion or weather
poor economic times. 98 The purpose of the Robinson-Patman amendment was to limit the availability of price differentials to situations
where there were adequate and objective economic justifications."9
preferred Texaco dealers.") (emphasis in original), Rez, supra note 31, at 666 (similar
language).
96. See ICC v. United States ex tel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 392 (1933); Handler II, supra note 14, at 32-33.
97. See supra notes 21-23, 52 and accompanying text. "'Ina secondary-line price
discrimination case, it is not the price differential itself which makes defendant's
conduct unlawful, just as it is not the merger itself which violates section 7; rather,
the illegality results (if at all) from the statute's proscribed 'anticompetitive effects'the likelihood that the alleged discrimination may substantially lessen competition."
Handler I. supra note 10, at 992 (footnote omitted).
98. See Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp.
985, 990 (S.D. Fla. 1949), af'd, 187 F.2d 919, modified on other grounds, 190 F.2d
73 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951); C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 303
& n.24, 523; Adelman, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorneyj General's
Report, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 222, 223-24 (1955). "'Injury to competition between
customers of the discriminating seller is easily understood. Customers who pay higher
prices than their competitors pay are hampered in their competitive efforts." Cooper,
supra note 34, at 969. A seller who gives a price advantage to one buyer is effectively
subsidizing the internal operations of the favored part), and increasing his competitive strength. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1969) (Marshall, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Purolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 882-84 (7th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); Policy and Law, supra note 32, at
101.
99. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1948); H.R. Rep. No. 2287,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1936); see S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1936);
80 Cong. Ree. 9417 (1936) (statement of Rep. Utterback); supra note 36 and acompanying text.
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It is arguable, therefore, that a direct business injury is incurred by
a non-favored purchaser at the time his rival receives a price advantage.100 In the past, discrimination had been characterized as an
interrelationship between the plaintiff and the favored rival "whereby
the difference granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage upon
the other."' 0' It was accepted that resale competition alone constituted an adequate relationship.1 02 It was assumed that the plaintiff
had been overcharged in order to subsidize the seller's lower price to a

competitor. 103 Under this theory, the plaintiff was injured even if the

rival merely pocketed his financial gain, 10 4 tracing the injury to the
05
time of the discrimination.1
A cognizable antitrust injury only occurs, however, when the fa-

vored competitor actually uses the price advantage competitively, 00
100. See C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 225. -'[T]he Clayton Act is concerned
primarily, if not exclusively, with commanding equality of price among competitors
at the time of purchase, rather than with the myriad factors of a reselling operation
which may . . . offset disadvantage on the one hand or advantage on the other.' "
Id. (quoting C.E. Niehoff & Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114, 1121-22, afj'd, 241 F.2d 37 (7th
Cir. 1957), modified on other grounds per curiam sub nora. Moog Indus., Inc. v.
FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958)).
101. 80 Cong. Rec. 9416 (1936) (statement of Rep. Utterback); accord id. at 8114
(statement of Rep. Patman); see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
103. 80 Cong. Rec. 9416 (1936) (statement of Rep. Utterback). See Levi, supra
note 24, at 66; Policy and Law, supra note 32, at 10 1.
104. See Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); Paceco, Inc. v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Indus.
Co., 468 F. Supp. 256, 263 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can
Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 990 (S.D. Fla. 1949), afJ'd, 187 F.2d 919, modified on other
grounds, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951); C. Edwards,
supra note 21, at 303, 523; Tomlin, supra note 10, at 191.
105. It is true that the favored competitor has an enhanced ability to compete.
This is unfair because it results from the price discrimination. Until the competitor
realizes this potential in any way, however, the plaintiff has not yet suffered an
anticompetitive injury. "Put in Brunswick's terms, the fact that the disfavored purchaser pays more for the same product than the favored purchaser, while constituting
a form of economic injury or harm to plaintiff's pocketbook, does not amount to
'antitrust injury' or provide a proper measure of antitrust damages." Handler I, supra
note 10, at 993; see, e.g., Dantzler v. Dictograph Prods., Inc., 309 F.2d 326, 330
(4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 970 (1963); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 1980-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,343, at 75,755-57 (E.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981); McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1332,
1341 (S.D. Ala. 1972), afJ'd mem. sub nom. Harrelson v. Texaco, Inc., 486 F.2d
1400 (5th Cir. 1973). The plaintiff must "quantify the loss" and trace specific losses to
specific acts. Goetz, supra note 83, at 133-34.
106. Tomlin, supra note 10, at 191. The "time" of injury for establishing a
Robinson-Patman violation is at the time of the price discrimination itself because
that is when the potential for injury is created. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37,
46 (1948); C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 234. For purposes of private recovery under
section 4, however, the potential must have been realized and the "time" of injury is
when the actual injury occurs. Areeda, supra note 83, at 1129-30. In Uniroyal, Inc.
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and the amount of damage
suffered is measured by the impact of that
"use" on the plaintiff.10 7 Thus, if the injury is simply the fact of the
lower price and the rival has not engaged in the "unfair" competition
contemplated by the Robinson-Patman Act, the plaintiff cannot recover. 0 8 The lower price must "act" to cause damage directly to the
plaintiff and be translated into a loss by the plaintiff to the favored
rival. 10 9 This is proof of antitrust injury because if the price discrimination was the cause of the plaintiff's alleged injury, he should be able
to match his loss with gain to the favored competitor." 0
Courts have required the plaintiff to make this match with varying
degrees of specificity. The traditional approach required the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant's conduct materially contributed to his

v.Jetco Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court found more
than adequate proof of Uniroyal's Robinson-Patman violation, but denied Jetco
relief, stating that " 'there is no presumption that proscribed discrimination in price
[or services] has caused damage to UJetco].' " Id. at 358 (quoting Sano Petroleum
Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1960)). "'There [is] no
necessary correspondence between preference and damage." ICC v.United States ex
rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 392 (1933).
107. See ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1933):
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133. 1136 (5th Cir. 1979),
vacated and remanded sub nora. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451
U.S. 557 (1981); Kidd v. Esso Stand. Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497, 498 (6th Cir. 1961) (per
curiam); Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F. Supp.
350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kelly v. General Motors Corp., 425 F. Supp. 13, 20 (E.D.
Pa. 1976); Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D. Or. 195S);
Handler II, supra note 14, at 33-34; Heim, supra note 15, at 204-05: Re , supra note
31, at 666.
108. See ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 392 (1933); Handler II, supra note 14, at 32-33.
109. See Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 243, 27576 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("no evidence of how many customers Sweeney lost to competitors as a result of the alleged discrimination . . .[therefore plaintiff] failed to provide a basis upon which the jury could determine the extent of injury, if any-), ajJfd.
637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); McCaskill v. Texaco,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (S.D. Ala. 1972) (need "causal connection between the
lower price to someone else and injury to the plaintiff's business or property"), aJ'd
mem. sub nom. Harrelson v. Texaco, Inc., 486 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1973): Alexander
v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 41 (W.D. La. 1957) ("Rather, the true yardstick of his
damages . . . would be the gross loss of profit on sales he otherwise would have made
to those customers who bought from the favored dealers, instead of from plaintiff
110. Kidd v. Esso Stand. Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497, 498 (6th Cir. 1961) (per curiam);
Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 243, 273-76 (E.D. Pa.
1979), aff'd, 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Kelly v.
General Motors Corp., 425 F. Supp. 13, 20 (E.D. Pa. 1976): Youngson v. Tidewater
Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D. Or. 1958); Alexander v. Texas Co., 165 F. Supp.
53, 58 (W.D. La. 1958); Rez, supra note 31, at 666.
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Under that view, the plaintiff did not need to "negative all

injury.'

possible alternative explanations for his decline in profits" 112 or to

show that the illegality "was a more substantial cause than any
other."

3

Recently, the courts have taken a stricter approach to the

concept of tracing and have allowed damages only when it has been
clear that the injury did not result from any form of legitimate compe-

tition or the plaintiff's own inadequacies.1 4 Some courts have even
required proof of specific lost sales."

5

The rationale behind a stringent tracing requirement is that section

4's allowance of treble damages is both compensatory" 0 and puni111. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9
(1969); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (5th
Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded sub nom. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981); see Heim, supra note 15, at 203 & n.11.
112. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 811 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977). The court also established that although a plaintiff must
prove some damages flowing from the antitrust violation "inquiry beyond this minimum point goes only to the amount and not the fact of damage." Id.
113. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144
(1968) (White, J., concurring); accord Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,
466 F.2d 1163, 1174 (7th Cir. 1972); Haverhill Gazette Co. v. Union Leader Corp.,
333 F.2d 798, 806 & n.16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964); Helm, supra
note 15, at 209.
114. In Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir.
1979), vacated and remanded sub nom. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981), the circuit court stated that the plaintiff must show that
the defendant's conduct materially contributed to his injury, " 'as a matter of fact
and with a fair degree of certainty.' " Id. at 1135-36 (quoting Terrell v. Household
Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16, 20 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 987
(1974)). The court further qualified its standard by announcing that "[c]onclusory
statements by the plaintiff, without evidentiary support, . . .are not sufficient.
Evidence of a slight decrease in market share roughly coincident with the alleged
violation is not sufficient either." Id. at 1136; accord Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon,
Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980);
63,343, at 75,762 (E.D.
Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
Wash. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981); McEntee &
Kahrl, supra note 10, at 182; Rez, supra note 31, at 669; Timberlake, supra note 10,
at 252.
115. See, e.g., Marty's Floor Covering Co. v. GAF Corp., 604 F.2d 266, 270-71
(4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Zwicker v. J.I. Case Co., 596
F.2d 305, 307-09 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Serv.,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Contra Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.,
395 U.S. 642, 648-49 (1969): Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466 F.2d
1163, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1972).
116. An examination of the initial House debate concerning provisions relating to
private damages reveals the primary legislative intent to "[open] the door of justice to
every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and
[give] the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered." 51 Cong. Ree. 9073
(1914) (statement of Rep. Webb); see id. at 9079 (statement of Rep. Volstead); id. at
9270 (statement of Rep. Carlin); id. at 9414-17, 9466-67, 9487-95 (floor debate). The
Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged section 4's remedial powers "to arm
injured persons with private means to retribution." Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American
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7

"[T]he desire to encourage private enforcement and to penal-

ize antitrust violations is no excuse for awarding damages that are
non-existent, inconsistent with antitrust policy, or unconnected with
the true rationale for imposing antitrust liability.- ' l l Private injury
to an individual does not necessarily occur when the defendant causes

a public injury by violating an antitrust law. "" This apparent paradox, that a defendant can violate an antitrust law and yet produce no

private injury, is less puzzling when the substantive law prevents both
real and potential injuries,12 0 as does the Robinson-Patman Act.'12 The
Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947); accord Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977) (treble damages primarily remedial). One commentator suggests that even when the damages are trebled, the award may still be
essentially compensatory in that the plaintiff may have suffered additional but
legally non-recognizable injuries as well. Tomlin, supra note 10, at 169 n.8.
117. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972): see Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969): Fortner Enters., Inc.
v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968). Many commentators suggest
that the punitive aspect of treble damages overshadows their compensatory role. See
3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 630c, at 96-97 (1978): Heim, supra note
15, at 203; Page, supra note 10, at 473; cf. Calderone Enters. Corp. v.United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971) (purpose of § 4 treble
damages to encourage private enforcement), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). The
House debates following the report of the conference committee indicate the intent of
the bill's sponsors to use treble damages as a law enforcement measure. 51 Cong.
Rec. 16,274-75 (1914) (statement of Rep. Webb): id. at 16,317-19 (statement of Rep.
Floyd). In the Senate, however, there was little discussion of the enforcement value
of treble damages, id. at 15,818-21 (statement of Sen. Reed); id. at 16,04246
(statement of Sen. Norris), although the Senate Judiciary Committee in reporting on
the Robinson bill noted that private enforcement would "'reliev[e] the Government
correspondingly of the burden of its cost." S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1936); accord Areeda, supra note 83. at 1127; Tomlin, supra note 10, at 169-71,
176; Compensable Injuries, supra note 76, at 423 n.77.
118. Areeda, supra note 83, at 1127; cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487 (1977) (Court unwilling to divorce "antitrust recovery from
the purposes of the antitrust laws"). There are two injury requirements under § 4(first) "actual" injury, resulting from (second) something forbidden in the antitrust
laws. There is concern that if these requirements are not narrowly construed, plaintiffs will receive excessive judgments for inconsequential injuries and defendants will
have no clear guidance as to what conduct will justify a penalty. See Calderone
Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115
F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954); Handler I, supra note 10, at 996-97.
119. Areeda, supra note 83, at 1130; Timberlake, supra note 10, at 232-33, 240;
see Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 436 F.2d 1205, 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 911 (1971); Guyott Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 942, 952-53 (D.
Conn. 1966).
120. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne. Inc., 607 F.2d 1133, 1137 (5th
Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded sub norm. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981); Kidd v. Esso Stand. Oil Co.. 295 F.2d 497, 498-99 (6th

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

plaintiff who alleges that a price difference caused a potential adverse

effect on competition must further prove that he was actually injured
2
in an amount that can reasonably be measured.12

2. Measure of Antitrust Injury in a Robinson-Patman Case
Having established the fact of his antitrust injury, the plaintiff must
then establish the amount of damages he has consequently suffered.
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the specificity required to
adequately trace an antitrust injury in a price discrimination case, but
it has explicitly disallowed the use of "automatic damages" 123 -that
is, the inference of damage in the amount of the price discrimina-

tion. 124
Translated into Robinson-Patman terms, antitrust injury is essentially an "undercharge" to the rival and not an "overcharge" to the
plaintiff, 12 because if there had been no discrimination the plaintiff
may not necessarily have received the lower price. Recovery is based
on tort law principles. 126 "Had [the plaintiff] received the lower
Cir. 1961) (per curiam); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 350.
358 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
122. Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,343, at 75,752-53
(E.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981).
Congress considered the prospect of treble damages sufficient incentive to encourage
private enforcement of the antitrust laws without creating a presumption of actual
injury stemming from the violation. 51 Cong. Rec. 9073 (1914) (statement of Rep.
Webb); Note, Antitrust-Robinson-PatmanAct-Private Litigants Need Not Show
Consequential Damages in Order to Recover Treble Damagesfor Price Discrimination Violations, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 400, 403-05 (1970).
123. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 561 & n.2
(1981). In Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 965 (1957), the Second Circuit ruled that a disfavored buyer is not automatically injured by reason of a price discrimination in his competitor's favor. Id. at 45859. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Enterprise approach and held that "unless the
evidence establishes a greater consequential injury, discrimination in prices or allowances is entitled to be regarded as constituting a direct business injury and that the
amount thereof thus properly can be made the basis and measure of a general
damage award." Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1969)
(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970). In J. Truett Payne, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Enterprise court's approach. 451 U.S. at 561 & n.2.
124. ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 389-90 (1933);
Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,343, at 75,756-57 (E.D.
Wash. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981); Uniroyal, Inc.
v. Jetco Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
125. Handler I, supra note 10, at 993; Handler II. supra note 14, at 31-35, see
Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,343, at 75,756 (E.D.
Wash. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981); Uniroyal, Inc.
v. Jetco Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 350, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
126. Handler II, supra note 14, at 33. Tort damages compensate plaintiffs for
their out-of-pocket losses. If the injury is equivalent to the amount of the discrimination, then the damage award will have only "accidental relevancy" to the actual
competitive injury suffered by the plaintiff. Confusion in the Courts, supra note 18,
at 953; see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903 comment a, at 453 (1979).
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price, he would have made more money, but he is not out of pocket
because a competitor bought more cheaply."' 2 7 If the injury were
viewed as an "overcharge," the plaintiff would be entitled to at least
the amount of the price difference because he would be paying directly for his rival's better position. When the injury is viewed as an
"undercharge," or more precisely, as the fact of the undercharge
which is the price difference, then injury to the plaintiff is not automatically the amount of
the difference but the amount of damage that
28
the difference caused. 1
The Supreme Court in J. Truett Payne refused to decide whether
Payne's proof was sufficient to establish damages, because the Robinson-Patman Act violation had not been sufficiently proven below.1'
The Court did indicate, however, that it favored leniency in proving
the extent of damages once the plaintiff has established that he was in
fact injured by a section 2(a) violation.1 30 The Court reviewed precedent13 ' in which it had consistently excused antitrust plaintiffs from
an unduly rigorous standard of proving damages. 32 Underlying these

127. Handler II, supra note 14, at 33.
128. ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 390-92 (1933). In this
analogous case involving illegal rate discriminations under the Interstate Commerce
Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 2, 8 (1976), the Court noted that while the injury from an
overcharge is the amount of the overcharge, the injury from a discrimination must be
measured in terms of the discrimination's effects. 289 U.S. at 389-90. "The Commission does not find, and the complainant does not assert, that the rate was unreasonable in the sense that it would be subject to condemnation if a like rate had been
charged to others similarly situated. What is unlawful in the action of the carriers
inheres in its discriminator' quality, and not in anything else. When discrimination
and that alone is the gist of the offense, the difference between one rate and another
is not the measure of the damages suffered by the shipper." id. at 389(citations
omitted).
129. 451 U.S. at 568-69.
130. Id. at 565-67: see Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d
964, 984 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978), Terrell v. Household
Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16, 20 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 987
(1974); Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,343, at 75,752
(E.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981): Goetz,
supra note 83, at 126; Page, supra note 10, at 489: Rez, supra note 31, at 670;
Timberlake, supra note 10, at 236; Tomlin, supra note 10, at 189. Mere speculation
or guesswork, however, as to the extent of the damage is not permitted. Bigelow v.
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946): Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931); see Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J.
Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133, 1137 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded sub
nom. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981): Terrell v.
Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16, 25 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed. 419
U.S. 987 (1974); Goetz, supra note 83, at 129.
131. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123-24
(1969); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927).
132. 451 U.S. at 565-67.
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decisions was the fear that defendants would be able to escape liability
by rendering the measure of damages uncertain, and that the inherent
vagaries of the marketplace make speculation
difficult as to what
133
would have happened absent the violation.
The leniency allowed the plaintiff in proving the extent of his injury
becomes superfluous, however, if the plaintiff is required to show the
fact of his antitrust injury specifically with precise tracing. 13 4 Once
the plaintiff has shown specific lost sales, he will have measured his
losses fairly accurately. 1 35 In J. Truett Payne, the Court implied that
the plaintiff may have to be specific only in proving the RobinsonPatman Act violation and the resulting economic injury. 3 0 Justice
Rehnquist clearly stated that even if the plaintiff proved a RobinsonPatman Act violation, he "is not excused from [his] burden of proving
antitrust injury and damages. It is simply that once a violation has
been established, that burden is to some extent lightened." 31 7 It is,
therefore, arguable that the plaintiff need only show that his injury
133. Id. at 566-67; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
123-24 (1969); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946);
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927).
"Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the
wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts." Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
134. See Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 811 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Goetz, supra note 83, at 139; supra notes 93-96 and
accompanying text.
135. American Coop. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907, 914 (7th
Cir.) (court carefully awarded damages only in those areas where it was absolutely
certain that plaintiff lost profits due to defendant's activities), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
721 (1946); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 243, 27476 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (as long as Enterprisesis the law, a plaintiff must show a specific
injury by competitive breakdown of the damages he has incurred as a result of the
alleged discrimination before he can recover), aff'd, 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Kelly v. General Motors Corp., 425 F. Supp. 13,
20 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("the liability of the defendants for price discrimination would
not be established unless Kelly and his fellow class members could individually
demonstrate that the higher prices they paid for original equipment replacement
parts caused them to lose profits to competing new car dealers"); Youngson v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D. Or. 1958) (in order to recover damages
"'one must show lost profits resulting from the necessity of meeting the prices of
favored competitors or lost sales to such favored competitors due to one's inability to
meet their prices, or both"); Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 41 (W.D. La.
1957) ("[r]ather, the true yardstick of [plaintiff's] damages, if any, in this respect
would be the gross loss of profit on sales he otherwise would have made to those
customers who bought from the favored dealers, instead of from plaintiff, because of
the price differential").
136. 451 U.S. at 566.
137. Id. at 568.
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proximately resulted from the antitrust violation. Then, although the
plaintiff will still be required to "trace" his loss to the favored competitor, he need not quantify it precisely. 38 This would enable him to
trace more easily an actual antitrust injury to an unfair competitive
act by his rival, especially when the rival uses the price allowance to
engage in competitive behavior other than lowering his resale price.
B. Proof of Antitrust Injury in a Robinson-Patman Case
For purposes of Robinson-Patman secondary-line cases, antitrust
injury is the rival's unfair competitive edge that is used to attract sales
or profits from the plaintiff.13 9 Thus, the injury must be traced to the
rival's competitive use of his price advantage.1 40 Proof of a lower
resale price has been described as the "sine qua non of any recover' in
a secondary line price discrimination case . . . . Then, and only
then, can the seller's grant of an unlawful lower price to the favored
buyer possibly result in injury to the plaintiff." 4 The plaintiff will
be damaged because either he will have to lower his price to meet this
competition that has been wrongfully induced, or he will choose not
4to lower his price and vill lose customers.'
The rival may use the price difference to his competitive advantage,
however, not only by lowering his resale price, but also by increasing
his advertising, offering additional service or engaging in competitive
activities which, because they are "subsidized," are "unfair." If the
plaintiff can show that he lost profits by increasing his advertising or
lost customers by failing to offer similar services which induced these
customers to get more for their money from the favored rival, then he
should be able to collect damages for the injury he has suffered.
138. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 124-25
(1969); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562
(1931).
139. See ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1933);
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir. 1979),
vacated and remanded sub nom. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451
U.S. 557 (1981); Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 40-41 (W.D. La. 1957);
Handler I, supra note 10, at 992-93; Heim, supra note 15, at 204; Rez, supra note 31,
at 666.
140. ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1933);
Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,343, at 75,756-57 (E.D.
Wash. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981); Uniroyal, Inc.
v. Jetco Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); McCaskill v.
Texaco, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aJJd mern. sub non.
Harrelson v. Texaco, Inc., 486 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1973); Alexander v. Texas Co.,
149 F. Supp. 37, 41 (W.D. La. 1957), Handler II, supra note 14, at 32.
141. Handler II, supra note 14, at 33- accord Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc.. 1980-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) J 63,343, at 75,756-57 (E.D. Wash. 1980), aJJ'd in part, rev'd in
part, 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981): Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Handler I, supra note 10, at 992-93.
142. Handler II, supra note 14, at 33-34: see supra notes 90-91 and accompanying
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"Where there is a basis on which a jury can reasonably infer significant antitrust injury, [one] should be4 3very hesitant before determining
that damages cannot be awarded."'

The FTC has long recognized that sales volume and price fluctua-44
tions do not constitute the only evidence of healthy competition.
Some courts in the past have recognized that a price advantage can be
used for competitive strategies other than a lowered resale price.'

4-, In

Corp., 4 "

the
Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales
defendant granted Sun Cosmetic's competitors an allowance for the
salary of a person to demonstrate the defendant's products but refused
to grant the plaintiff any assistance. 147 The Second Circuit properly
held that the salary allowance, as the amount of the price discrimination, was not the proper measure of the plaintiff's injury. 148 The
court stated that because Sun Cosmetic did not hire a demonstrator
with its own money it was in the same position as its favored competitors in terms of monetary outlay. However, "[t]he plaintiff [was]
entitled .

.

. to prove all damages from the diversion of its customers

to those New Jersey 'agencies,' to whom the defendant furnished
'demonstrators,' so far as that was due to the 'demonstrators.' "'40
If the plaintiff's injury satisfies the requirements of being actual and
antitrust, then he should not be precluded from attempting to trace
his losses to the favored competitor's actual use of the price advantage
merely because the competitor did not use it to lower his resale price.
The "lower resale price" is an attractive limitation on proving antitrust injury because price-affecting behavior is arguably easier to

143. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 304 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); see Catalano Inc. v. Target Sales Inc., 605 F.2d
1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
144. E.g., Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253, 255 (7th Cir. 1956), rert.
denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 155 (7th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); see Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238
F.2d 43, 51-52 (8th Cir. 1956), aJJ'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); Helm, supra
note 15, at 208; Tomlin, supra note 10, at 180.
145. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133, 1135 (5th Cir.
1979) (plaintiff gave greater allowances on used-car trade-ins in order to meet rival's
competition), vacated and remanded sub nom. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981); Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466
F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1972) (court recognized that a free car wash may be a form
of customer solicitation equivalent to a price cut); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v.
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949) (salary of a demonstrator is a competitive advantage); accord C. Edwards, supra note 21, at 532; Heim,
supra note 15, at 208; Tomlin, supra note 10, at 180, 187.
146. 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
147. Id. at 151.
148. Id. at 153.
149. Id.

1982]

TRACING ANTITRUST INJURY

show and measure. In a practical sense, it will be difficult for the
plaintiff to show that a specific customer bought his car from a
favored competitor because the competitor offered him a "free" tuneup, or that it was the advantageous price from the seller that originally triggered the promotional strategy. It is almost as difficult,

however, to show that the price difference caused the competitor to
lower his resale price and that he would not have lowered it if he had

not received the unlawful subsidy.

50

The plaintiff is essentially required to "prov[e] a negative "'5 1 by
showing that he lost customers or profits because of an advantage
afforded to his competitor. Any requirement of a specific positive act

would not be sufficiently comprehensive. Each situation must be
examined on its independent facts. Justice Cardozo acknowledged
that the question of how much worse off the plaintiff is because others
have paid less "is not independent of time and place and circumstance. It calls
for something more than the use of a mathematical
2

formula."

5

CONCLUSION

With the increasingly strict requirements placed on a private plaintiff to prove initially that the Robinson-Patman Act vas, in fact,
violated, it is reasonable to allow him some leeway in tracing his
actual injury to the proved violation. If the favored competitor actually uses his price advantage to engage in anticompetitive behavior
that, if only "potential," would violate the Robinson-Patman Act,
then the plaintiff in a private action should be allowed to prove he lost
sales or profits to the rival's fulfillment of that potential. If the plaintiff is granted some leniency in proving the antitrust dimension of his
injury, it follows that he should be permitted to trace his loss to
anticompetitive conduct other than a rival's lowered resale price.
Amy A. Marasco

150. The difficulty of proof lies in the fact that it is hard to measure market effects
and to predict hypothetically what would have occurred absent the violation. See
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1969);
Areeda, supra note 83, at 1127; Cooper, supra note 34, at 981; Goetz, supra note 83,
at 125; Tomlin, supra note 10, at 180, 189; Symposiun, supra note 20, at 200.
151. Petition for Certiorari at 12, J. Truett Payne, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
451 U.S. 557 (1981).
152. ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 390 (1933). Justice
Cardozo held that the price difference was an evidentiary circumstance to be viewed
in light of all the circumstances. Id. at 389-93. Justice Marshall, in Perkins v.
Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), also pointed out that when applying antitrust
laws the court" 'must look at the economic reality of the relevant transactions.' '"Id.
at 651 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 208 (1968)).

